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THE STRAW THAT BREAKS THE CAMEL’S BACK: A FINAL
ARGUMENT FOR THE DEMISE OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
FRAMEWORK
Taylor Gamm*

I. INTRODUCTION
Few relics remain from the 1970s: technology, music, and hairstyles
have all changed. Yet, one fad that has refused to yield to the test of
time is the framework courts use to decide employment discrimination
cases. Typically, legal standards naturally evolve as society progresses, 1
due to shifting policy aims, the discovery of new information, or
technological advances.2 However, employment discrimination
jurisprudence has defied the status quo, and refuses to diverge from the
framework that was developed forty years ago. Although this anomaly
could be explained by the test’s merits, a more realistic explanation is
that the lack of transformation is due to complacency and an
unwarranted adherence to precedent.
This Article questions the continued validity of a decades-old test in
an analysis of the McDonnell Douglas Framework, 3 which was created
in 1973 and remains a stalwart in employment discrimination cases. 4
More specifically, this Article explores (1) the background of the
important statutory and judicial developments of employment
discrimination claims; (2) the criticisms of the McDonnell Douglas
Framework and its alternatives, including the “Convincing Mosaic;” 5
and (3) a recent Seventh Circuit case, Ortiz v. Werner,6 which struck
down the use of the “Convincing Mosaic.” This Article then proceeds to
make two arguments as to why the Ortiz decision demands the demise
of the McDonnell Douglass Framework. First, the logic behind the
Seventh Circuit’s prohibition of the Convincing Mosaic parallels the
arguments for the elimination of McDonnell Douglas.7 Second, with the
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. LARRY W. YACKLE, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2379 (1993).
2. MAX S. OPPENHEIMER, Zero and the Rise of Technological Lawmaking, 34 PACE L. REV. 1,
5 (2014).
3. This method for litigating employment discrimination tests has, at different times, been
called a test and a Framework. This Article will refer to it as a Framework or simply as McDonnell
Douglas.
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994).
6. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).
7. For more criticisms of the Framework see, e.g., Wells v. Colo. DOT, 325 F.3d 1205, 12211228 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring); Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why
McDonnell Douglas is not Justified by Any Canons of Statutory Construction, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 743
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Seventh Circuit’s elimination of the distinction between circumstantial
and direct evidence, McDonnell Douglas is obsolete. This Article
concludes with a suggestion of how employment law should carry
forward without this cumbersome framework.
II. BACKGROUND
This section explores the history of McDonnell Douglas, beginning
with a background of Title VII and an explanation of a key principle in
the development of McDonnell Douglas: the distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence. It then details the case that created the
infamous framework and a case that limited its functionality.
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted “to eliminate,
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures,
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national
origin.”9 Title VII states, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for any
employer to take any adverse employment action or otherwise
discriminate against an employee on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 10 Any person who is legally protected against
discrimination on the basis of the aforementioned traits is considered a
member of a protected class. Title VII also provides a secondary
protection for those members of protected classes by making it unlawful
for an employer to retaliate against an employee “because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.”11 The Supreme Court noted Congress’s
deliberately broad language, and has applied it liberally. 12
Title VII provides a cause of action for employees who experience
(2006); Kenneth Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 703 (1995).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2016).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 2402 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401; but see
Chuck Henson, Title VII Works—That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV.
ISS. 41 (arguing that Title VII was not actually enacted to completely eradicate discrimination in the
workplace).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (West 2016).
12. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). (The Supreme Court took
note of Congress’s use of broad language, finding that its purpose in enacting Title VII was “to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”).
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either disparate impact or disparate treatment at the hands of their
employers. Disparate treatment is “the most easily understood type of
discrimination,” and occurs when a plaintiff is treated less favorably
than a fellow employee due to the person’s membership in a protected
class.13 A disparate impact claim, however, alleges that an employment
practice, though lacking deliberate discriminatory motive, resulted in the
functional equivalent of intentional discrimination. 14 McDonnell
Douglas and this Article focus on those disparate treatment claims,
which can be substantiated through two different types of evidence:
direct and circumstantial.
B. Direct and Indirect Evidence
In any trial, there are two types of evidence that may be presented:
direct or indirect evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary defines direct
evidence as “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or
observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.”15 In the employment context, the “fact” is a
discriminatory animus motivating the adverse employment decision.
Circumstantial—or indirect—evidence, contrarily, is “based on
inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.” 16 Circuit
courts have not been uniform in their designations between direct and
indirect evidence, and even within individual circuits, opinions have not
demonstrated consistency. 17 Notwithstanding the Federal Rules of
Evidence and every other area of law treating circumstantial and direct
evidence as equally probative, 18 this distinction is imperative in
employment law jurisprudence. The necessity to sort evidence between
these two categories developed through the subsequent judicial
interpretation of the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, as detailed below. 19

13. Intl. Broth. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 at FN 15 (1977).
14. Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
15. Evidence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16. Id.
17. Ezra S. Greenberg, Stray Remarks and Mize-Motive Cases After Desert Palace v. Costa: A
Proximity Test for Determining Minimal Causation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1795, 1814 (2008).
18. United States v. Kwong, 14 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing HENRY DAVID THOREAU,
Journal, 11 Nov. 1850, in 2 Journal of Henry D. Thoreau 94 (Bradford Torrey & Francis H. Allen eds.,
1962) (“Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk”)).
19. See TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas test is
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination).
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C. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: The Birth of The BurdenShifting Framework
In the early 1970s, one man’s civil rights activism inadvertently
caused a change in employment jurisprudence, the effects of which are
still being discussed some forty years later.20 The case began when, after
the plaintiff’s employment with the McDonnell Douglas Corporation
was terminated, he participated in a “stall-in” against the company to
protest his discharge, which he believed was fueled by racial animus. 21
The plaintiff, along with other members of the Congress on Racial
Equality, illegally stalled his car on a main road to inhibit the traffic
flowing to and from his former employer’s factory. 22 When the
defendant refused to rehire the plaintiff, he filed suit in the Eastern
District of Missouri.23
The plaintiff sued his employer for two violations of Title VII under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
refused to rehire him due to his race in violation of 703(a)(1), and due to
his participation in protected civil rights activities in violation of
704(a).25 The District Court disagreed with both arguments. 26 The case
was then heard by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which handed
down a disjointed decision that was comprised of a majority, a
concurrence, and a dissent.27 The Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari to reconcile the “two opinions of the Court of Appeals and the
several opinions of the three judges,” which showed “a notable lack of
harmony” in the “applicable rules as to burden of proof and how this
shift upon the making of a prima facie case.”28 In an attempt to resolve
the rift, the Supreme Court promulgated a three-part burden-shifting
framework, which directed the plaintiff and employer through an
employment discrimination claim. 29 Since 1973, this framework has
been a cornerstone of employment law and has been applied to a broad
20. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy’s New Big Idea, 96 B.U.L. REV. 1789 (2016).
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794-797 (1973).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 796.
25. Id.
26. Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (The District Court
held that because the EEOC had not found “reasonable cause to believe the defendant” refused to rehire
the plaintiff because of his race, his 703(a)(1) claim must necessarily be dismissed. Secondly, the
District Court found that because Mr. Green’s stall-in was illegal, his actions were not protected under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and consequently dismissed his 704(a) claim as well.).
27. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972) (affirming the dismissal of
the plaintiff’s 704(a) and remanded the 703(a)(1) claim for further fact finding).
28. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801.
29. Id. at 801-805.
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spectrum of employment disputes.
In phase one of McDonnell Douglas Framework, the plaintiff “carries
the initial burden under [Title VII] of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.”30 A prima facie case may be proved by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority, (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job which the employer was seeking applicants, (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s
qualifications. 31
Under this standard, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court agreed
that the plaintiff met his burden because his employer continued to seek
applicants for the position for which the plaintiff was well qualified. 32
In phase two of the Framework, the burden33 “must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee’s rejection.”34 On this prong, the Supreme Court found that
the employee’s involvement in unlawful deliberate acts against the
corporation was a sufficiently legitimate justification to refuse to rehire
him. 35 The Court also recognized, however, that corporations may hide
true discriminatory animus behind a façade of legitimacy; thus, the
inquiry could not stop at this point. 36
The third and final phase of the Framework—the pretext phase—
shifts the burden back to the claimant to prove that “the presumptively
valid reasons for [the adverse employment action] were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.” 37 On this matter, the Supreme
Court remanded the plaintiff’s case for further fact finding. 38 The Court

30. Id. at 802.
31. Id. In footnote 13, the Court noted that “[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases,
and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” Id. at fn. 13.
32. Id. at 802.
33. The Supreme Court later clarified that to overcome the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the
burden placed on the employer was only one of production, and that the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
34. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03.
35. Id. It was under this prong that the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in its
judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff could only be fired for objectively justified reasons.
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court held instead that
this would disallow corporations from refusing to hire persons for legitimate reasons. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03.
36. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 806.
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also provided guidance on the types of evidence that were probative to
this prong, including the employer’s treatment of the employee, any
reaction to previous civil rights acts, and general policy and practice
regarding minorities, which can be demonstrated through statistics and
hiring practices.39
E. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: An Early Limitation on the Framework
After roughly fifteen years of jurisprudence under McDonnell
Douglas, it became apparent that the Framework left certain, less
obvious discriminatory employment decisions unsanctionable. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that McDonnell
Douglas was not appropriate to adjudicate less palpable “mixed-motive”
cases. 40 In mixed-motive cases, an employer has both legitimate legal
reasons to take an adverse employment action, but is also motivated by
illegal and discriminatory notions. For example, the plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse was passed over for a promotion partially as a result of
illegal gender stereotyping.41 The employer was also driven, however,
by a legitimate desire to maintain satisfactory customer service. “The
Court . . . made clear that ‘mixed-motives’ cases such as [this] are
different from pretext cases such as McDonnell Douglas . . . .”42 Thus,
rather than apply the three-part McDonnell Douglas Framework, the
Court maintained that a plaintiff could recover from an employer after
two steps: first, the plaintiff must provide proof that the employment
decision was motivated at least partially by the employee’s membership
in a protected class; and second, the employer could not prove that the
same decision would have been made notwithstanding the employee’s
protected class membership.43
In the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, Congress also
recognized that mixed-motive cases required a different analysis, and
established that “an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”44 The
amendment both superseded and codified the holding in Price

39. Id. at 804.
40. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
41. Id. at 256. The plaintiff presented evidence that the employer made statements such as, her
“professional” problems would be solved if she would “walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Id.
42. Id. at 260.
43. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).
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Waterhouse. Congress maintained the first motivating factor prong, but
eliminated the second prong that allowed employers to avoid liability by
proving the same decisions would have been made notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.
In accordance with Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price
Waterhouse, many courts required “direct evidence” to find for the
employee in mixed-motive cases.45 However, this practice came to a
sojourn in 2003, when the Supreme Court, in Desert Palace v. Costa,
abrogated the “direct evidence” requirement in mixed-motive
employment cases. 46 Thus, while finding distinctions between direct and
circumstantial evidence is abnormal in general practice, it has become
somewhat commonplace in employment law. This need to distinguish
between the two types of evidence took hold in other applications of the
McDonnell Douglas Framework, and is one of many complaints
litigants, attorneys, judges, and legal scholars have with the test. 47
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
The effects of McDonnell Douglas on employment law were
profound. This section focuses first on the issues McDonnell Douglas
aimed to fix. Secondly, it explores the ways in which the Framework has
fallen short in the goals it set out to accomplish. Lastly, it details the
alternative methods different circuits have employed to decide
employment discrimination cases as alternatives to McDonnell Douglas.
A. What McDonnell Douglas Aimed to Fix
Before the McDonnell Douglas era, employment discrimination
claims were treated as any other civil suit. The burden of proof remained
with the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
adverse employment action was taken due to an unlawful animus based
on a claimant’s protected trait.48 Many perceived this burden to be
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276. (“In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on
the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that
an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision”) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
46. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Interestingly, though, this holding has been
limited to mixed motive claims under Title VII. For Age Discrimination and other claims, the “direct
evidence” requirement still percolates.
47. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 17 at 1798.
48. See Reid v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1972) (“The burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to prove that he was not hired because of discrimination based upon race or religion.
Discrimination must be proved by the plaintiff.”); King v. Laborers Int'l Union, Union Local No. 818,
443 F.2d 273, 276 (6th Cir. 1971) (“The burden is upon the plaintiff. Before plaintiff can recover in this
lawsuit he must show that this Union intentionally followed a practice or pattern of discrimination
against him because of his race. Where the proof is upon a person, he must carry that proof by what is
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insurmountable because the employee had only evidence of the
employer’s actions, not the underlying animus. 49 Thus, the McDonnell
Douglas Framework was designed “to ease the evidentiary burdens on
employment discrimination plaintiffs, who rarely are fortunate enough
to have access to direct evidence of intentional discrimination.” 50
Many argue that, although a valiant effort, the Supreme Court’s
Framework did not amount to the model of clarity that it endeavored to
be. 51 Rather, the burden-shifting Framework created more consternation
among lower courts than what existed in pre-McDonnell Douglas
jurisprudence. 52 Yet, this test has garnered critiques for reasons other
than the confusion it has produced. 53
B. Judicial Inefficiency
One prominent criticism of the McDonnell Douglas Framework is
that its confusing technicalities are inconsistent with the goal of judicial
economy. 54 As one commentator articulated, the confusion is a result of
two characteristics of the Framework. 55 First, by the time the case
reaches trial and as a result of the Framework’s three distinct parts, the
plaintiff has already proven a prima facie case of discrimination, and the
defendant has promulgated a valid, legal motivation for the employment
action. 56 Therefore, “applying the entire framework at the end of a jury
trial only makes sense in those rare instances where the defendant fails
to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.” 57
When certain elements have already been established, requiring the jury
to go back through these phases is time consuming and confusing. 58
known as a preponderance of the evidence.”).
49. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) (“the ‘prima facie case,’
‘burden of persuasion,’ and the shifting ‘burden of production’ have caused considerable difficulty for
judges of all levels….”); DAVIS, supra note 7 (“this cryptic decision has caused endless confusion”).
52. See, e.g., supra note 7.
53. See, e.g., Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem With Pretext, 85 DENV. U.L. REV. 503
(arguing the Framework over-compartmentalized evidence, relied on a dichotomy between “mixedmotive” and single-motive cases, which has no basis in the 1991 Civil Rights Amendment, created an
artificial distinction between direct and indirect evidence, and produced jury confusion); Sperino, supra
note 7 (arguing that the Framework has no statutory basis).
54. See, e.g., Wells v. Colo. DOT, 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hurtz, J., concurring)
(“the artificiality of the framework exacts a significant, unnecessary expense--in terms of both wasted
judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial error.”); Tymkovich, supra note 53 at 527-529.
55. Sandra F. Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 262
(2013).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 263.
58. Id.
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Secondly, because the test places a different burden on the employer—
the burden of production—the jury is unlikely to understand that they
must judge the second prong with a different level of credence than the
first and the third.59 Indeed, the jury may not be able to relinquish this
role as they pass through to the second phase of the Framework. 60 A
secondary source of wasted judicial resources arises when, due to the
confusion of the Framework, inaccurate decisions are made at trial and
are subsequently appealed. 61
C. Distracts from the Important Inquiry
A second critique of the McDonnell Douglas Framework is that the
various technicalities take away from the ultimate question of
employment discrimination cases: whether sufficient evidence was
presented to prove that the employer was motivated by discriminatory
animus.62 Even when utilized by the highest-revered arbiters of law—
the Supreme Court—the test has proven “difficult for the bench and the
bar.”63 As many have identified, the unfortunate result is that the parties
and judges become entangled in distinguishing direct from indirect
evidence, proving prima facie cases, proffering a valid non-pretextual
reason, and subsequently rebutting it, rather than focusing on whether
the employer was motivated by illegal discriminatory reasons for taking
an employment action against the employer. 64
D. Summary Judgment Implications
Many argue that the McDonnell Douglas Framework produced a
third, unforeseen consequence: the persistent use of summary judgment
in employment cases.65 Employment discrimination cases have seen

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Whittington v. Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 998 (10th Cir. 2005) (“unnecessary
complexity increases the opportunity for error”).
62. Wells v. Colo. DOT, 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., Concurring) (“The
McDonnell Douglas framework only creates confusion and distracts courts from ‘the ultimate question
of discrimination vel non.”) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 714 (1983))).
63. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual
Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 859, 901 (“Applying the multi-element McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case may distract the factfinder from the contested issues or may even result in
questionable dismissals.”).
65. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and
Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 285–86 (2012); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
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higher rates of summary judgment than any other type of cases. 66 A
Federal Judicial Committee found that summary judgment was granted,
either in part or in whole, in employment discrimination cases seventyseven percent of the time. 67 In tort and contract cases, summary
judgment was granted sixty-one percent and fifty-nine percent of times,
respectively. 68 Furthermore, on appeal, plaintiffs’ employment
discrimination victories were reversed with higher frequency than
defendants’ victories. 69 At least one judge, who has resided at both the
trial court and appellate level, attributed the high rate of summary
judgment for defendants to the McDonnell Douglas Framework. 70 Judge
Chin, from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, argued that it was the
aforementioned complexities of the test that distract plaintiffs’ attorneys
from focusing on the true issue of the intent of the employer. 71 Thus,
critics concluded that although the McDonnell Douglas Framework was
designed to make the plaintiff’s case easier to prove, statistical evidence
suggested that it had not accomplished this goal. 72
E. Lacks a Statutory Basis
According to several scholars, the Supreme Court’s enunciation of the
McDonnell Douglas Framework had no valid basis in Title VII. 73 After
a thorough exploration of the canons of statutory construction, one
commentator concluded that three of the four elements of the prima

Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and
Employment
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 525–26 (2010).
66. THEODORE EISENBERG & CHARLOTTE LANVERS, Summary Judgment Rates over Time,
Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts, 1718 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-022, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373.
67. Hon. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s
Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 671, 673 (2012-2013).
68. Chin, supra note 67.
69. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court:
From Bad to Worse? 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 109 (2009) (plaintiffs’ won pretrial and at trial
were reversed approximately thirty percent and forty-one percent of the time, respectively, while
defendants’ won pretrial and at trial were reversed approximately eleven percent and nine percent of the
time, respectively).
70. Chin, supra note 67.
71. Id. at 682; Judge Chin also suggested that the lack of racial diversity may be an additional
cause of this phenomenon, as minority judges were far less likely to grant summary judgment to
defendants in employment discrimination cases compared to white judges. Id.
72. Id.
73. Griffith v City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Absent from this opinion
was any justification or authority for this scheme”).
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facie case cannot be supported.74 Specifically, the Framework required
the plaintiff to prove he or she was qualified for the job, yet, the plain
meaning, the legislative history, and congressional intent do not support
the notion that only a qualified plaintiff may be illegally discriminated
against.75 If the Framework operates as an evidentiary standard, 76 critics
have similarly found an insufficient relationship between the Framework
and Title VII to justify its continued use. 77 When creating evidentiary
standards, courts typically begin with considerations of the policy
behind the law and allocate the burdens of proof to further the specified
policy.78 Thus, considering the remedial goals of Title VII, a plaintifffavorable burden is logical.79 However, as evidenced by the high rate of
successful summary judgment motions by defendants, the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting Framework places unnecessary burdens on the
plaintiff. 80 It is, therefore, contended that Title VII cannot justify
McDonnell Douglas as a product of statutory interpretation or as a
burden-shifting Framework. 81
G. Requires a Distinction between Direct and Indirect Evidence
A final concern regarding the Framework is that it requires making a
superfluous and, at times, indeterminable distinction between direct and
indirect evidence. 82 Many circuit courts attempted to categorize the
plaintiff’s evidence as direct and exempt from the Framework or indirect
and apt for McDonnell Douglas analysis.83 The justification behind this
distinction is that when “smoking gun” evidence of an employer’s
discrimination is presented, the employee no longer needs to go through
the prima facie phase of the test, and can instead go directly to the
merits of the case. Not only does this approach present yet another
technicality which distracts courts from assessing the most important
question, but it also relies on the “subtle and difficult distinction
between direct and indirect or circumstantial evidence.”84

74. Sperino, supra note 53 at 764-768.
75. Id. at 764-768.
76. Professor Sperino detailed the confusion among courts about whether McDonnell Douglas
served to establish a prima facie case or operates as an evidentiary burden. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. But see Henson, supra note 9 (arguing that Congress never intended Title VII to wholly
eliminate discrimination; thus, the McDonnell Douglas Test furthers that aim).
81. See Sperino, supra note 53.
82. Tymkovich, supra note 55 at 520-21; see also Sperino, supra note 7 at 773.
83. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 743-45 (8th Cir. 2004).
84. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONSEQUENCE OF INHERENT ISSUES OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
FRAMEWORK
Many courts recognized the latent issues of the McDonnell Douglas
Framework and, accordingly, drastically limited its application. This
section serves two purposes: first, to show the ways in which the
limitations of McDonnell Douglas caused circuit courts and the
Supreme Court to restrict its applicability in certain phases of litigation;
and second, to establish that the circuit courts developed an array of
tests and methods as alternatives to the McDonnell Douglas Framework.
A. Limiting McDonnell Douglas
Recognizing that the McDonnell Douglas Framework is unworkable
in a jury instruction and that two of the three parts of the test are
irrelevant by the time the case reaches the jury, many courts prohibit its
use for jury trials.85 In fact, the Second Circuit held that “the traditional
McDonnell Douglas formulation, developed by appellate courts for use
by judges, is at best irrelevant, and at worst misleading to a jury.” 86 For
the same reason, other courts limited its use strictly to pretrial
proceedings. 87 Some critics have further opined that because the
Framework is held back from juries, it may be inappropriate to decide
summary judgment motions using McDonnell Douglas.88 Because
summary judgment should be granted only if a reasonable jury could not
have a sufficient basis for finding for the non-moving party, the
argument goes that a standard which is inappropriate for jury
determinations is also inapplicable to summary judgment decisions. 89
Yet still, a majority of jurisdictions refused to apply the test at the
appellate level, as well, on the grounds that after a full trial has been
completed, “the focus is . . . not on the plaintiff’s prima facie case or the
McDonnell Douglas framework.”90 Rather, courts of appeals were
advised to concentrate on whether the plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding. 91
The Supreme Court placed multiple limitations on the applicability of
the Framework. First, it was well established that the McDonnell
85. See Sperino, supra note 55 at 262.
86. Mobasher v Bronx Cmty. Coll. Of N.Y., 269 Fed. App’x 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2008).
87. Gehring v. Case Corp, 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The presumptions and burden
inherent in the McDonnell Douglas formulation drop out of consideration when the case is submitted to
the jury.”).
88. Sperino, supra note 55 at 271.
89. Sperino, supra note 55 at 271.
90. Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., 549 F.3d 985, 993 (5th Cir. 2008).
91. Id.
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Douglas Framework was inoperable when courts were faced with a
mixed-motive case.92 Secondly, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A, the
Court held that the McDonnell Douglas Framework was an evidentiary
standard, and plaintiffs were not required to allege facts sufficient to
meet the test in pleadings. 93 Lastly, in United States Postal Service
Board of Governors v. Aikens, the Court agreed with lower courts that
once there was a jury verdict, the “McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
presumption drops from the case, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a
new level of specificity.”94
A majority of circuits courts further limited the Framework’s
applicability by restricting it to cases where only indirect evidence of
employment discrimination was presented.95 The distinction was based
on the premise that “[d]irect evidence of discrimination, if credited by
the fact finder, removes the case from McDonnell Douglas because the
plaintiff no longer needs the inference of discrimination that arises from
the prima facie case.”96 Other circuits held that the McDonnell Douglas
Framework simply became unworkable once the plaintiff produced
direct evidence of discrimination.97
Due to the issues inherent to the McDonnell Douglas Framework,
courts of all levels across the United States severely confined its
application. It was prohibited from use in jury instructions, at jury trials,
on appeal, and when direct evidence was presented, thus rendering the
Framework applicable in only a negligible portion of cases.
B. Alternative Approaches to McDonnell Douglas
Some circuits have done more than merely limit the use of
McDonnell Douglas; they have created substitute methods to resolve
employment discrimination cases. These approaches include the
Missouri Approach, the Harassment Framework, and the Convincing
Mosaic.

92. Supra Part II E.
93. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
94. The abandonment of McDonnel Douglas when reviewing a judgment after trial has been
used to argue that it should no longer be used at the summary judgment stage because “review of
summary judgment is essentially the same as our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence at
trial.” Wells v. Colo. DOT, 325 F.3d 1205, 1228 (Hurtz, J., concurring).
95. See Blalock v. Metals Trades, 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985); Prince-Garrison v. Md. Dept’ of
Health and Mental Hygiene, 317 Fed. App’x 351, 353 (4th. Cir. 2009); McCullough v. Univ. of Ark.
For Med. Scis. 559 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2009).
96. Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair Cty., 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1987).
97. Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990).
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1. The Missouri Approach
Missouri adopted its own version of the Civil Rights Act, and
similarly prohibits disparate treatment in employment based on race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex. 98 Until 2007, Missouri courts
used the McDonnell Douglas Framework when Title VII claims were
brought. 99 However, after the Missouri Supreme Court determined that
Title VII claims necessitated a right to a jury trial, complications
predictably arose when the state courts attempted to implement
McDonnell Douglas into jury instructions. 100 Thus, in 2007, the
Missouri Supreme Court in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights
abolished the use of the Framework and created an alternative
approach.101 Missouri courts no longer use the three-part burden-shifting
Framework in deciding a summary judgment motion; rather, the sole
determination is whether the plaintiff’s proved membership in a
protected class was a “contributing factor” in the adverse employment
action. 102
2. The Harassment Framework
Under Title VII, employees in a protected class may also file a
harassment suit against their employer. For these types of cases, which
often involve factual patterns similar to those in employment
discrimination cases, courts wielded a simpler method of navigating
harassment claims. Judges do not rely on the McDonnell Douglas
Framework. 103 Rather, a plaintiff must simply prove that the harassment
occurred because of the protected trait, and that the harassment was
sufficiently severe to disrupt the plaintiff’s work environment. 104 The
Harassment Framework proves that there are alternate ways of
conceptualizing employment discrimination and ways to work through a
fact-intensive inquiry without utilizing a confusing burden-shifting
framework.

98. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through the end of the 2016 Regular
Session and Veto Session of the 98th General Assembly).
99. Henson, supra note 9 at 110-111.
100. Id. at 112.
101. See generally Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007).
102. Henson, supra note 9 at 113 (“The focus of the case begins and ends with the question of
discrimination rather than the distraction of legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons, stray
comments, same actor inferences and other defenses which enable the kind of disparate treatment we
believed Title VII was meant to prevent.”).
103. Sperino, supra note 55 at 268.
104. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
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3. The Convincing Mosaic Framework
The Seventh Circuit also developed an alternative method to
adjudicate Title VII claims. In Troupe v. May Department Stores, Judge
Posner presented the idea that there were certain pieces of evidence,
which alone did not provide conclusive evidence, however, when
viewed together, the evidence composed “a convincing mosaic of
discrimination against the plaintiff.” 105 Though McDonnell Douglas was
not abrogated from the Seventh Circuit’s case law, the new method
allowed plaintiffs who had circumstantial evidence to forego the
McDonnell Douglas Framework, and proceed under the Convincing
Mosaic. 106 If the plaintiff could present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate a convincing mosaic of discrimination, then it was no
longer necessary to go through the burden-shifting Framework; the
plaintiff could proceed directly to the merits of the case, as if she had
presented direct evidence. 107 The Convincing Mosaic became
commonplace in both trial and appellate level decisions until it was
recently revoked. 108
V. ORTIZ V. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.: AN APPLICATION OF THE
CONVINCING MOSAIC
In August 2016, the Seventh Circuit struck the death knell for the
Convincing Mosaic. 109 The method had recently garnered heavy
scrutiny; thus, the court took advantage of the opportunity to prohibit its
further use when Henry Ortiz filed a lawsuit against his employer,
alleging violations of both the Illinois and Federal Civil Rights Acts. 110
For seven years, Ortiz worked as a freight broker for the defendant,
Werner Enterprises, before his termination in 2012. 111 The defendant’s
decision to terminate Ortiz, he alleged, was illegally motivated by
discrimination against Ortiz’s race. 112 To support his claim, Ortiz
provided evidence that he was barraged with racial slurs by his superiors
throughout the tenure of his employment and that he was terminated for
commonplace, albeit wrongful, behavior in the company. 113
105. Troupe v. May Department Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994).
106. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016).
110. Ortiz v. Werner Enters. Inc., No. 13-cv-8270, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82952, *1 (N.D. Ill.
June 25, 2015).
111. Id. at *4.
112. Id. at *6-*8.
113. Id.
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The district court considered this evidence through two discrete
avenues: the direct method and indirect method. 114 Under the direct
method, the court found that illegal discrimination could be proved with
either direct or circumstantial evidence. 115 Finding the direct evidence—
the racial slurs—insufficient to satisfy the direct method, 116 the court
then considered whether the circumstantial evidence “create[d] ‘a
convincing mosaic of discrimination,’ which would permit a jury to
infer intentional discrimination.” 117 Citing Seventh Circuit precedent, 118
the district court opined that a convincing mosaic could be established
through circumstantial evidence that “‘point[ed] directly to a
discriminatory reason for the employer's action . . . and [was] directly
related to the employment decision.’” 119 Ortiz failed this test as well,
largely due to conflicting evidence on the regularity of what Ortiz
claimed was customary behavior within the corporation. 120 Ultimately,
the district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
after it also concluded that Ortiz failed the indirect method of proof
under McDonnell Douglas.121
Ortiz’s appeal allowed Judge Posner and the panel to ensure that the
Seventh Circuit had seen the last of the Convincing Mosaic. 122 In fact,
all prior Title VII employment discrimination decisions were overruled
to the extent that the Convincing Mosaic was relied upon. 123 Trial courts
were admonished that any future decisions based upon this notion were
subject to summary reversal.124 These drastic measures were taken due
to the array of issues that plagued the Convincing Mosaic and the
inadvertent consequences of its application. The court laid out these
issues in full.
The court criticized the enigmatic categorization of evidence into two
disparate categories, which would be analyzed separately under different

114. Id. at *9.
115. Id. at *9-*10.
116. The court found that this evidence did not meet the direct test because the racial slurs were
not directly related to the adverse employment action. Id.
117. Id. at *12 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
118. See Dass v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1071 (7th Cir. 2012); Teruggi v. CIT
Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2013); Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d
935, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2003).
119. Ortiz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82952 at *12 (citing Adams, 324 F.3d at 939).
120. Ortiz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82952 at *11-*14. The district court also cited a lack of
evidence of a suspiciously-timed termination. Id.
121. Id. at *14-*15. The district court found that Ortiz would not be able to pass the pretext phase
of the McDonnell Douglas Test. Id.
122. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 763.
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standards.125 The method employed by the lower court required judges
to consider whether the plaintiff presented direct evidence or, separately,
“a convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that was sufficient to
prove discrimination.126 The Seventh Circuit found this technique
problematic for several reasons. 127 First, direct evidence was not
inherently more reliable, and should not “be treated differently from
other evidence because it can be labeled ‘direct’ . . . .”128 Secondly,
“shoehorning” evidence into these two distinct categories disallowed
trial courts from efficiently viewing the claimant’s evidence in its
entirety. 129 Frequently, the distinction between the two types of
evidence was unclear; thus, the court questioned the efficiency of
“hav[ing] two tests if they consider the same information and answer the
same question.”130 Lastly, and most importantly, the Seventh Circuit
found that the Convincing Mosaic “detracted attention from the sole
question that matters: Whether a reasonable juror could conclude that
Ortiz would have kept his job if he had a different ethnicity, and
everything else had remained the same.” 131
Beyond the issues created by separating direct and indirect evidence,
the court found additional reasons to ban further use of the Convincing
Mosaic. 132 For instance, the test lacked any statutory basis, as it was not
rooted in any of the statutes governing employment-discrimination
cases. 133 Further, referencing the product of the convincing mosaic as “a
form of legal kudzu,” the court clearly acknowledged that it had only
confounded an already challenging area of law. 134
After underlining the outright ban on both the Convincing Mosaic and
any further distinctions between direct and circumstantial evidence, the
Seventh Circuit panel made a final “point of clarification [that] may be
helpful.”135 The court stressed that the “decision [did] not concern
McDonnell Douglas.”136 Rather, the court concluded that its ban on
separating evidence as direct or circumstantial was “consistent with

125. Id. at 763-64.
126. Id. at 763.
127. Id. at 764-767.
128. Id. at 765. In fact, the court states that eliminating this distinction was the very intent of the
convincing mosaic image in the first place. It was to serve to view both direct and circumstantial
evidence in one image.
129. Id. at 763.
130. Id. at 765.
131. Id. at 764.
132. Id. at 764-44.
133. Id. at 764.
134. Id. at 765.
135. Id. at 766.
136. Id.
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McDonnell Douglas and its successors.”137
The court subsequently reversed the district court’s grant of the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment under “the correct standard,”
which focused on whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race caused the adverse
employment action. 138 The court held that there remained a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Ortiz was fired for a business
practice that was generally tolerated when done by non-protected
employees.139 Thus, the case was remanded to be decided under the reestablished legal standard.140
VI. ARGUMENT
The decision in Ortiz v. Werner presents two new arguments for the
abolition of the McDonnell Douglas Framework to supplement the
prolific literature arguing for such a change. First, many of the
justifications behind eliminating the use of the Convincing Mosaic
reflect the same shortcomings of McDonnell Douglas, and abrogating
the use of the former while protecting the latter is inconsistent. 141
Secondly, after Ortiz v. Werner firmly eradicated the distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence in the Seventh Circuit, the
continued vitality of the Framework stands on unsteady ground, as many
circuits continue its use based on this distinction alone.
A. The Similar Shortcomings of the Convincing Mosaic and McDonnell
Douglas
The Seventh Circuit’s chief complaint about the Convincing Mosaic
was that its use “detracted from the sole question that matters: Whether
a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plaintiff] would have kept his
job if he had a different ethnicity, and everything else had remained the
same.”142 Both McDonnell Douglas and the Convincing Mosaic have
been accused of requiring an inane focus on insignificant technicalities,
which blurs the big picture and obfuscates the goal of Title VII:
providing recourse for employees who have been discriminated against
137. Id.
138. Id. at 765.
139. Id. at 766-67.
140. Id. at 766-67. This standard is termed “re-established” because the standard was used in
previous Seventh Circuit cases that did not use the McDonnell Douglas Framework. See, e.g., Achor v.
Riverside Golf Club, 117 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 1997).
141. Davis, supra note 64 at 869 (“The Court's devotion to stare decisis and the climate of racial
politics probably account for the masquerade”).
142. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764.
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in the course of their employment. 143 The parallel complaints find a
source in McDonnell Douglas’ mandate to shoehorn evidence into
certain phases and the Convincing Mosaic’s requirement to designate
evidence as direct or indirect and to analyze each separately. 144 Just as
Judge Posner found that “the search for elusive mosaics has complicated
and sidetracked employment-discrimination litigation for many years,”
another Seventh Circuit Judge noted that the goals of the McDonnell
Douglas Framework, to “clarify and simplify the plaintiff’s task in
presenting . . . such a case . . . have gone by the wayside.”145
A further justification for overruling the use of the Convincing
Mosaic was its failure to be “rooted in the statutes that govern
employment-discrimination cases.”146 Judge Posner queried how lower
courts established the Convincing Mosaic without citing to any statutory
authority; 147 this same criticism, however, has been launched against the
McDonnell Douglas Framework. 148 Neither of the methods’ plain
language has an obvious nexus to Title VII. Indeed, as noted earlier,
only one of the four factors in a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
can be found in the language of Title VII. Similarly, the Convincing
Mosaic was unapologetically founded in a metaphor describing a
method to view the plaintiff’s direct and circumstantial evidence. Thus,
both methods suffer from a dearth of statutory justification.
Further alluded to in the Ortiz decision are the inefficiencies plaguing
the Convincing Mosaic. First, the Convincing Mosaic requires the fact
finder to “consider the same information in multiple ways” if the piece
of evidence does not fit squarely within the direct or indirect
category. 149 The McDonnell Douglas Framework, if employed at the
end of litigation, is subject to the same criticism. A further concern of
the Convincing Mosaic is that some relevant evidence will not be
considered unless it fits into one of the two methods. Likewise, some
evidence only relevant to the pretext phase may never be heard under
McDonnell Douglas if the plaintiff loses on summary judgment and has
only provided prima facie evidence. Disabling judges and juries from
hearing the totality of the plaintiff’s evidence will instantaneously result
in erroneous decisions and an increased volume of post-verdict
143. Compare id. with William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A
Proposal to let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U.L. REV . 447 (2013) (McDonnell
Douglas has become a “tool for plaintiffs becomes a straightjacket for litigants and a distraction from
consideration of substantive discrimination issues”).
144. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765.
145. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Coleman, J., concurring).
146. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 53.
149. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765.
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motions. 150
A secondary source of inefficiency, which is produced by the
Convincing Mosaic and is shared with the McDonnell Douglas
Framework, is confusion. Judge Posner employed the phrase
“convincing mosaic” “as a metaphor to illustrate why courts should not
try to differentiate between direct and indirect evidence.” 151 Lower
courts, however, misunderstood it as the opposite and implemented the
phrase as a separate test, having elements of its own. 152 Worse, in the
years since it was established, the Seventh Circuit vacillated between
employing the convincing mosaic and criticizing it.153 The lack of
uniformity within the jurisdiction produced inconsistent results and sent
an unclear message to the lower courts as to when, or if, the Convincing
Mosaic should be used. Correspondingly, the McDonnell Douglas
Framework was removed from jury instructions, jury trials, and on
appeal by various courts, including the Supreme Court. Thus, lower
courts are similarly befuddled as to when or if the Framework applies. 154
When two tests suffer identical shortcomings and one of them is
banished from the judicial toolbox, a logical next step is to question the
validity of the other. Yet, after marching through all the deficiencies that
plague both the Convincing Mosaic and the McDonnell Douglas
Framework, the Seventh Circuit veered in the contrary direction and
took affirmative steps to protect the Framework. 155 Thus, Seventh
Circuit judges cannot claim ignorance as to the complications of the
McDonnell Douglas Framework, as many have written critiques of
McDonnell Douglas, which mirror the Ortiz decision. Most pointedly, in
Coleman v. Donahue, Judge Wood wrote a concurrence to highlight the
“snarls and knots” the McDonnell Douglas Framework has inflicted
upon employment discrimination cases, and two other judges signed on
150. Whittington v. Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 998 (10th Cir. 2005).
151. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 764-65 (citing Hatcher v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, No. 151599, 829 F.3d 531, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12959 (7th Cir. July 14, 2016), slip op. 13). See Chaib v.
Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 981 (7th Cir. 2014); Cloe v. Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1180 (7th Cir. 2013);
Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 901 (7th Cir. 2012); Good, 673 F.3d at 674; Silverman v. Board of
Education of Chicago, 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011); Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 779
(7th Cir. 2006) (cases where the Seventh Circuit has treated the convincing mosaic as a legal
requirement); but see Good v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 673 F.3d 670, 680 (7th Cir. 2012);
Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 314 (7th Cir. 2012); Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718
F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2013); Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2013); Chaib, 744
F.3d at 981 (cases where the Seventh Circuit has disapproved the search for mosaics).
154. Sandra Sperino, Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the
McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 349 (2007) (“Regarding state law discrimination
claims, state courts should play a role in answering questions about whether McDonnell Douglas and its
burden-shifting scheme are even applicable at the trial stage”).
155. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766.
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to the opinion.156 Judge Wood opined that McDonnell Douglas may
have been necessary forty years ago, but she questioned whether it
should have a role in the future of employment litigation. 157 She
ultimately suggested that it was perhaps time to “restore flexibility to the
pretrial phase” by eliminating the use of the decades old test. 158
Furthermore, in Gehring v. Case Corp., the Seventh Circuit found that
McDonnell Douglas was irrelevant after the plaintiff proved a prima
facie case, recognizing that jury instructions should not include the
burden-shifting Framework “for very good reason.” 159 Gehring
effectively eliminated the use of the final two phases of the test. 160 In
Brewer v. Bd. Of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., the Seventh Circuit even seemed to
favor the Convincing Mosaic over McDonnell Douglas, referencing the
Convincing Mosaic as the “conventional method” 161 when directly
comparing the two methods.
The defects that motivated the Seventh Circuit to write a forceful
opinion prohibiting further use of the Convincing Mosaic are the very
same flaws of the McDonnell Douglas recognized by the very same
court. The only logical question remaining, then, is how can the
continued use of McDonnell Douglas be justified? One explanation is
forty years of precedential value. In 1993, Justice Souter vouched for the
vitality of McDonnell Douglas, reasoning that courts and litigants have
depended on the Framework to structure lawsuits, and that the structure
should not be casually abandoned. 162
Precedential value, however, is insufficient justification because,
although forty years of precedent exists, the case law has done anything
but provide clear guidance to lower courts. The principle of stare decisis
is advanced on grounds that consistency and predictability are integral to
“the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”163 Even in
situations where precedent is not necessarily correct, the interests of
predictability have outweighed the interests of having a correct test or
interpretation.164 However, due to the debilitating flaws of the
156. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994).
160. Id.
161. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A plaintiff can avoid summary
judgment in two ways: the burden-shifting method… often called the ‘indirect’ method of proof, or the
conventional method of presenting a ‘convincing mosaic’ of direct or circumstantial evidence….”)
(emphasis added, internal citations removed).
162. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 540 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
164. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right”).
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Framework, it has achieved neither consistency nor predictability and,
therefore, cannot be sustained on these grounds. The line of Supreme
Court cases from McDonnell Douglas to Burdine, which attempted to
clarify the types of burdens imposed on each party, to Price
Waterhouse, which provided the “motivating factor” analysis, to Desert
Palace, which abrogated the need for direct evidence in mixed-motive
claims, demonstrate the chaotic incoherence within McDonnell
Douglas’ progenies. 165 Therefore, there is a much stronger argument
that the McDonnell Douglas Framework should be abolished once and
for all because the judicial history of McDonnell Douglas, like that of
the Convincing Mosaic, has been so severely inconsistent.
A side-by-side comparison of the Convincing Mosaic and McDonnell
Douglas critiques presents the arduous task of reconciling the
abandonment of the former with the protection of the latter. Especially
considering the copious criticisms against McDonnell Douglas within
the Seventh Circuit, it seems clear that the McDonnell Douglas
Framework has no remaining use in the Seventh Circuit. If the uncanny
parallels between the flaws of the two methods are inadequate catalysts
for the Seventh Circuit to treat McDonnell Douglas with the same
disdain, there is an alternate, perhaps stronger argument as to why the
Framework should be prohibited.
B. Ortiz v. Werner Extinguished a Distinction on which the McDonnell
Douglas Framework Relies
The Ortiz decision made one point abundantly clear: Seventh Circuit
district courts are henceforth banned from attempting to categorize and
separately analyze evidence as either direct or circumstantial. Though
the Seventh Circuit proffered that the merging of the two categories was
consistent with the “McDonnell Douglas Framework and its progeny,”
this conclusion ignores the fact that courts still rely on the distinction in
determining whether it is appropriate to apply McDonnell Douglas.166
Furthermore, the elimination of the dichotomy renders the McDonnell
Douglas Framework obsolete. Lastly, although Ortiz clearly directed
district courts’ treatment of evidence, it failed to explain the role of
McDonnell Douglas in future litigation.

165. Stephen Rich, A Matter of Perspective: A Textualism, Stare Decisis, and Federal
Employment Discrimination Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197 (2014).
166. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016).
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1. The Abolishment of the Dichotomy is Not Consistent with
Subsequent Interpretations of the Framework
Most circuits required the use of the McDonnell Douglas Framework
only after it had been determined that the plaintiff did not have direct
evidence of discrimination. 167 This method originated from Teamsters v.
United States, one of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of McDonnell
Douglas, and had been consistently employed since its inception.168
Thus, the Seventh Circuit oversimplified the current state of
employment discrimination law by making the conclusory statement that
the abrogation of classifying direct and indirect evidence was consistent
with McDonnell Douglas. On the contrary, the distinction thrived in
many other jurisdictions, and was justified by years of case law
interpreting McDonnell Douglas as requiring the evidentiary
dichotomy. 169
2. The Abolishment of the Distinction Prohibits the Framework in the
Seventh Circuit
The McDonnell Douglas Framework has no remaining legitimacy in
the Seventh Circuit because its use depended upon a legal principle
which the Ortiz decision rendered void. Before applying the Framework,
courts first determined whether the plaintiff had presented direct or
indirect evidence. 170 Though this distinction was eradicated in mixedmotive cases and was irrelevant in every other area of law, it has
remained pertinent to employment discrimination cases. 171 Ortiz
recognized that the distinction between the two types of evidence was
not only unimportant but was also frequently unintelligible and
consequently rebuked the practice of categorizing evidence as such.172
Therefore, the initial inquiry, which determined the applicability of the

167. Sperino, supra note 55 at FN 54 (citing Ray v. Oakland Cnty. Circuit Court, 355 Fed. App'x
873, 876 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To maintain a Title VII claim where there is no direct evidence of
discrimination, the plaintiff's indirect evidence is considered under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).”)); accord EEOC v. Boeing Co., 577
F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009); Martin v. Waring Invs. Inc., 323 Fed. App'x 313, 315-16 (5th Cir.
2009) (same in ADEA case); McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir.
2009); Prince-Garrison v. Md. Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, 317 Fed. App'x 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2009); Salinas v. AT&T Corp., 314 Fed. App'x 696, 698 (5th Cir. 2009).
168. See Intl. Broth. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 358, FN 44 (1977) (the McDonnell
Douglas does not require direct evidence of discrimination).
169. See, e.g., TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Swierkiewicz 534 U.S. 506, 511
(2002).
170. See supra Part I B.
171. See supra Part I B.
172. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Framework, no longer has a place in the Seventh Circuit. Because
McDonnell Douglas relies on a now defunct legal principle, it is
obsolete in that circuit. If the Seventh Circuit’s abrogation of the
dichotomy serves as a catalyst for other circuits to follow suit, the
Framework will similarly be superseded in those jurisdictions, as well.
3. Ortiz Failed to Direct District Courts when to Implement McDonnell
Douglas
Even prior to Ortiz, the appropriate time to employ the McDonnell
Douglas analysis within the Seventh Circuit was not obvious. The
Convincing Mosaic essentially allowed plaintiffs to bypass the burdenshifting Framework by proceeding under the direct method with
circumstantial evidence. Thus, where most circuits required a plaintiff to
utilize the Framework, the Seventh Circuit did not. Post-Ortiz, the
requirement for when to utilize the Framework is further confounded.
The Ortiz opinion exerted an entire paragraph ensuring the vitality of
McDonnell Douglas, yet, it failed to explain the circumstances which
warrant its use. In fact, Judge Posner went on to decide the issue of Ortiz
without mentioning the burden-shifting Framework again. The court did
not assess the district court’s application of McDonnell Douglas, and it
did not indicate that Framework should be employed on remand. On the
contrary, Judge Posner explicitly directed the trial court to decide the
case under a different standard: “whether the evidence would permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race . . . caused the
discharge . . . .” Although Ortiz was at the summary judgment stage—
the procedural point at which many circuits use McDonnell Douglas—
the Framework was bypassed. It can be reasonably assumed that the
court preferred an alternative method to McDonnell Douglas, yet, it
nevertheless asserted the Framework’s viability despite eliminating one
of its key principles.
Seventh Circuit district courts have begun the process of
implementing Ortiz. In one case, despite the parties spending much of
their briefing on the application of the McDonnell Douglas Framework,
the district court decided the case by viewing the evidence in the
entirety, and cited the standard for summary judgment laid out in
Ortiz.173 In a Family Medical Leave Act claim, another district court
explicitly rejected both the need for the plaintiff to satisfy the
McDonnell Douglas factors in order to prove a prima facie case “in light
of Ortiz” and the direction from the Seventh Circuit to stop separating

173. Aliferis v. Generations Health Care Network at Oakton Pavillion, LLC, No. 15 C 3489, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127054, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 19, 2016).
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evidence. 174 Yet still, another decision held that “the pattern identified in
McDonnell Douglas is just one way that the record evidence could
enable a reasonable juror to find discrimination,” proving that some
courts still considered it a viable method. 175 Furthermore, since Ortiz,
the Seventh Circuit has still advised a district court on the correct
application of McDonnell Douglas, demonstrating that there remains
considerable confusion in the Seventh Circuit regarding the applicability
of the Framework.176
C. Solution
Determining that Supreme Court precedent should be overruled is not
within a Circuit Court of Appeal’s prerogative. 177 “[E]ven where
subsequent decisions or factual developments may appear to have
significantly undermined the rationale for [an] earlier holding,” lower
courts must adhere to precedent.178 Thus, until either the Supreme Court
or Congress comes to the realization that the flaws and limitations of the
McDonnell Douglas Framework have rendered it obsolete, the
antiquated Framework will haunt Title VII claims. In State Oil Co. v.
Khan, the Supreme Court overturned a prior decision after it determined
that much of the decision had been eroded by its own subsequent
decisions. 179 Similarly, “there is not much . . . to salvage” from
McDonnell Douglas.180
In place of the complicated burden-shifting Framework, employment
law discrimination claims should be treated as any other tort claim.
Judge Wood, in her concurrence in Coleman, advocated for the
collapsing the three phases of McDonnell Douglas into one flexible
standard.181 The sole inquiry would be whether a jury could conclude
that the employer took the adverse action on account of his or her
protected class, not for any non-invidious reason.182 Judge Wood’s
suggestion mirrors the standard articulated in Ortiz, and also reflects the

174. Kemp v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 15-cv-4176, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152854, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 3, 2016).
175. Zegarra v. John Crane, Inc., No. 15 C 1060, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150225, at *22 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 31, 2016).
176. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., 840 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the district
court did not use a flexible enough standard in determining whether the plaintiff had presented a prima
facie case of discrimination.).
177. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001).
178. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 594 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997).
180. Id.
181. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2011).
182. Id.
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burden placed on plaintiffs in other civil claims.
Eliminating the use of McDonnell Douglas in favor of Judge Wood’s
flexible standard would exponentially simplify employment
discrimination law and better serve the original purpose of Title VII.
Without the constraints of McDonnell Douglas, judges and litigants can
focus on one key inquiry rather than on insignificant details, such as
whether the evidence is direct or indirect, the phase evidence properly
belongs, or if a plaintiff presented a prima facie case. 183 Eliminating
unnecessary technicalities will produce more accurate and efficient
decisions. 184 This solution also resolves various criticisms that the
standard utilized to resolve Title VII claims have minimal relation to the
statutory language, as Judge Wood’s standard plainly reflects the
language of Title VII.185
VII. CONCLUSION
The McDonnell Douglas Framework has remained at the forefront of
employment law litigation for over forty years. Though it seemed the
Seventh Circuit’s recent decision provided sufficient animus to abrogate
the use of the inefficient, cumbersome, and out-of-date Framework once
and for all, Judge Posner left many wishing for more. The litany of
complaints Judge Posner had against the Convincing Mosaic parallels
what many argue against McDonnell Douglas. Furthermore, Ortiz’s
prohibition on categorizing evidence eliminated the remaining safe
haven for the Framework: where the plaintiff presented indirect
evidence. Many circuit courts rely on this distinction to indicate when
the court should apply the burden-shifting Framework. Thus, without
the categorization, the test is left standing on highly unstable grounds.
The Framework can no longer be justified in the Seventh Circuit, and if
other circuits recognize the fallacy of the evidentiary dichotomy, the
Framework will be void in those circuits, as well.
Though the original intent was to ease the plaintiff’s burden, the
McDonnell Douglas Framework has arguably become a judge’s
instrument to dismiss plaintiff’s claim. 186 Perhaps the detailed burden
shifting was necessary forty years ago when employment discrimination
cases were new; however, the Framework is now out of date and should
be abandoned. Ortiz provided a glimmer of hope that McDonnell
Douglas will, like other relics of the 1970s, slowly fade out of use after
183. See supra Part III B, C.
184. See supra Part III D, F.
185. See supra Part III E.
186. Schneider, supra note 65 at 564 (“[M]any Federal judges appointed over the last several
years appear to be deeply skeptical of civil rights and employment cases”).
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circuit courts continue to reduce its applicability. However, after
recognizing the risk of error and the potential injustices of the
Framework, “[o]ne . . . wonders why we need to have this artificial,
often confusing, framework. The answer is that there is no need.” 187
Judges are well-versed in employment discrimination law, and binding
them to the cumbersome Framework is no longer practicable, much less
necessary. To avoid the caustic effects of McDonnell Douglas and to
give full cadence to Title VII, employment discrimination claims should
be decided with the flexibility permitted for all other civil cases.

187. Wells v. Colo. DOT, 325 F.3d 1205, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003).
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